Arbeitspapier/Forschungsbericht

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2010

URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500

Serientitel: MAGKS Joint discussion paper series in economics

Serienzählung: 2010, 17

Abstract: 

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation.

Harvard-Zitierstil: Tillmann, P. (2010) Strategic forecasting on the FOMC. (MAGKS Joint discussion paper series in economics, 2010, 17). Marburg: Philipps-University Marburg. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500

APA-Zitierstil: Tillmann, P. (2010). Strategic forecasting on the FOMC. (MAGKS Joint discussion paper series in economics, 2010, 17). Philipps-University Marburg. https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500