Journalartikel
Autorenliste: Paha, Johannes
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2023
Seiten: 357-366
Zeitschrift: Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Bandnummer: 19
Heftnummer: 3
ISSN: 1744-6414
eISSN: 1744-6422
DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007
Verlag: Oxford University Press
Abstract:
This article presents a model where the managers of two firms decide about adopting a sustainable production technology (or product). It demonstrates under what conditions a firm experiences a first mover disadvantage from going green, which may potentially be overcome by a sustainability agreement serving as a device for equilibrium selection in a coordination game with multiple equilibria. If the technology adoption game is, however, a prisoner's dilemma, the sustainability agreement must be structured like a hardcore cartel.
Zitierstile
Harvard-Zitierstil: Paha, J. (2023) SUSTAINABILITY AGREEMENTS AND FIRST MOVER DISADVANTAGES, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 19(3), pp. 357-366. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007
APA-Zitierstil: Paha, J. (2023). SUSTAINABILITY AGREEMENTS AND FIRST MOVER DISADVANTAGES. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 19(3), 357-366. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhad007
Schlagwörter
Anticompetitive agreement; competition policy; Coordination game; First mover disadvantage
