Journalartikel

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2022

Zeitschrift: Land Use Policy

Bandnummer: 114

ISSN: 0264-8377

eISSN: 1873-5754

Open Access Status: Hybrid

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983

Verlag: Elsevier

Abstract: 
This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.

Harvard-Zitierstil: Kvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T. and Bukin, E. (2022) Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine, Land Use Policy, 114, Article 105983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983

APA-Zitierstil: Kvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T., & Bukin, E. (2022). Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine. Land Use Policy. 114, Article 105983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983