Journal article

Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers


Authors listBruehn, Tim; Goetz, Georg

Publication year2018

Pages577-590

JournalManagerial and Decision Economics

Volume number39

Issue number5

ISSN0143-6570

eISSN1099-1468

Open access statusGreen

DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928

PublisherWiley


Abstract
We analyze exclusionary conduct of platforms in 2-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard 2-sided market model, we show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for the incumbent and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the 2 shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.



Citation Styles

Harvard Citation styleBruehn, T. and Goetz, G. (2018) Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers, Managerial and Decision Economics, 39(5), pp. 577-590. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928

APA Citation styleBruehn, T., & Goetz, G. (2018). Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers. Managerial and Decision Economics. 39(5), 577-590. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928



Keywords


EXTERNALITIESMALLSNAKED EXCLUSION

Last updated on 2025-10-06 at 10:52