Journalartikel

Institutional choice versus communication in social dilemmas - An experimental approach


AutorenlisteBischoff, Ivo

Jahr der Veröffentlichung2007

Seiten20-36

ZeitschriftJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Bandnummer62

Heftnummer1

ISSN0167-2681

eISSN1879-1751

DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.01.003

VerlagElsevier


Abstract
This paper presents an experimental study that compares the ability of human groups to escape the tragedy of the commons through institutional change or communication. Teams of five players are placed in a dynamic CPR environment with inefficient institutional settings. The results clearly show the vital importance of communication. At the same time, the groups who were allowed to replace the inefficient institutional settings by other more appropriate rules performed worse than those groups who were not given this opportunity. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.



Zitierstile

Harvard-ZitierstilBischoff, I. (2007) Institutional choice versus communication in social dilemmas - An experimental approach, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(1), pp. 20-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.01.003

APA-ZitierstilBischoff, I. (2007). Institutional choice versus communication in social dilemmas - An experimental approach. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 62(1), 20-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.01.003



Schlagwörter


COMMONSCOMMUNICATIONgroup behaviorGROUP-SIZEinstitutional choicelaboratory experimentPROVISIONPUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTSRESOURCE DILEMMASSOCIAL DILEMMASSTRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS


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