Conference paper

Publication year: 2000

Pages: 271-280

Journal: Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce

Volume number: 10

Issue number: 4

ISSN: 1091-9392

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327744JOCE1004_05

Conference: International Conference on Electronic Commerce

Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group

Abstract: 
In electronic commerce, the intraorganizational coordination of directly responsible units, for example profit centers or firms within an affiliated group, is of increasing importance. These organizational units fan be modeled within a multiagent system (MAS), an interconnection of autonomous information systems. In this article, we investigate coordination mechanisms for MAS in decentralized transportation planning that ensure efficient allocation of scarce resources on the basis of local planning processes. In the domain of transportation, planning problems are characterized by large amounts of data, limitations of time for planning, and the intractability of computational problems. Auctions as market-like coordination mechanisms are discussed with respect to the trade-off between theoretical evidence on the quality of the allocation and computational tractability. Therefore, 2 pricing mechanisms are investigated, the generalized Vickrey auction and pricing per column.

Harvard Citation style: Gomber, P., Schmidt, C. and Weinhardt, C. (2000) Pricing in multiagent systems for transportation planning, Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 10(4), pp. 271-280. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327744JOCE1004_05

APA Citation style: Gomber, P., Schmidt, C., & Weinhardt, C. (2000). Pricing in multiagent systems for transportation planning. Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce. 10(4), 271-280. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327744JOCE1004_05