Journalartikel
Autorenliste: Kreilkamp, Niklas; Matanovic, Sascha; Schmidt, Maximilian; Wöhrmann, Arnt
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2023
Seiten: 2349-2374
Zeitschrift: Review of Managerial Science
Bandnummer: 17
Heftnummer: 7
ISSN: 1863-6683
eISSN: 1863-6691
DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0
Verlag: Springer
Abstract:
This paper presents a review of research regarding the effects of monetary executive incentives on risk-taking. More precisely, we investigate executives' risk-taking (i) in response to the curvature (steepness, convexity, concavity) of the compensation function and (ii) with regard to reference points. Thereby, we refine and update common textbook knowledge. In this vein, we identify essential moderators at the personal, firm, or environmental level that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the incentive scheme in a specific context. Implications for incentive system design in practice and paths for future research are discussed.
Zitierstile
Harvard-Zitierstil: Kreilkamp, N., Matanovic, S., Schmidt, M. and Wöhrmann, A. (2023) How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review, Review of Managerial Science, 17(7), pp. 2349-2374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0
APA-Zitierstil: Kreilkamp, N., Matanovic, S., Schmidt, M., & Wöhrmann, A. (2023). How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review. Review of Managerial Science. 17(7), 2349-2374. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-022-00582-0
