Journal article

Publication year: 2000

Pages: 373-392

Journal: LABOUR

Volume number: 14

Issue number: 3

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9914.00138

Publisher: Wiley

Abstract: 

Efficient labour contracts on wages and employment could contribute to a reduction in unemployment in Europe. Their implementation is hindered by institutional settings and asymmetric incentives at different levels of the bargaining process. Employed workers have no incentives to forego wage increases at the firm level for potential employment gains, while employers’ federations possess no means to guarantee an employment increase for the sector covered by a wage agreement. Decentralization of wage bargaining does not solve this incentive problem. It is demonstrated that the introduction of marketable certificates may reduce the asymmetric incentive effects enabling contracts with higher employment.

Harvard Citation style: Winker, P. (2000) Efficient Labour Contracts: Impediments and How to Circumvent Them, Labour : review of labour economics and industrial relations, 14(3), pp. 373-392. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9914.00138

APA Citation style: Winker, P. (2000). Efficient Labour Contracts: Impediments and How to Circumvent Them. Labour : review of labour economics and industrial relations. 14(3), 373-392. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9914.00138