Journalartikel

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2010

Seiten: 263-294

Zeitschrift: Review of Finance

Bandnummer: 14

Heftnummer: 2

ISSN: 1572-3097

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp025

Verlag: Oxford University Press

Abstract: 
This paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Both self-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonable explanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996 and December 2006 show that rating conservatism may play a role for industrial firms, but self-selection cannot be fully rejected. Neither can it for insurance companies, though data restrictions impede further conclusions. For unsolicited bank ratings, however, we find strong evidence that rating conservatism is an important cause. The downward bias also appears to increase along with banks' opaqueness.

Harvard-Zitierstil: Bannier, C., Behr, P. and Güttler, A. (2010) Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?, Review of Finance, 14(2), pp. 263-294. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp025

APA-Zitierstil: Bannier, C., Behr, P., & Güttler, A. (2010). Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?. Review of Finance. 14(2), 263-294. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfp025