Journal article
Authors list: Kvartiuk, Vasyl; Herzfeld, Thomas; Bukin, Eduard
Publication year: 2022
Journal: Land Use Policy
Volume number: 114
ISSN: 0264-8377
eISSN: 1873-5754
Open access status: Hybrid
DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983
Publisher: Elsevier
Abstract:
This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.
Citation Styles
Harvard Citation style: Kvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T. and Bukin, E. (2022) Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine, Land Use Policy, 114, Article 105983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983
APA Citation style: Kvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T., & Bukin, E. (2022). Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine. Land Use Policy. 114, Article 105983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983
Keywords
AGRICULTURAL LAND; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; FEDERALISM; Hedonic pricing model; Land auctions; Public land; REFORM; Spatial model; Ukraine