Journalartikel

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2021

Seiten: 393-409

Zeitschrift: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

Bandnummer: 21

Heftnummer: 3

ISSN: 1566-1679

eISSN: 1573-7012

Open Access Status: Hybrid

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w

Verlag: Springer

Abstract: 
Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list price collusion in the USA and Europe, and it presents a theory of harm suggesting that a combination of anchoring, orientation on reference points, and loss aversion may render list price collusion effective in raising transaction prices-even if firms set transaction prices in a non-coordinated fashion.

Harvard-Zitierstil: Boshoff, W. and Paha, J. (2021) List Price Collusion, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 21(3), pp. 393-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w

APA-Zitierstil: Boshoff, W., & Paha, J. (2021). List Price Collusion. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. 21(3), 393-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w