Journal article
Authors list: Boshoff, Willem H.; Paha, Johannes
Publication year: 2021
Pages: 393-409
Journal: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Volume number: 21
Issue number: 3
ISSN: 1566-1679
eISSN: 1573-7012
Open access status: Hybrid
DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list price collusion in the USA and Europe, and it presents a theory of harm suggesting that a combination of anchoring, orientation on reference points, and loss aversion may render list price collusion effective in raising transaction prices-even if firms set transaction prices in a non-coordinated fashion.
Citation Styles
Harvard Citation style: Boshoff, W. and Paha, J. (2021) List Price Collusion, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 21(3), pp. 393-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w
APA Citation style: Boshoff, W., & Paha, J. (2021). List Price Collusion. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. 21(3), 393-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-021-00360-w
Keywords
Anchoring; Antitrust; Cartel; Collusion; Discount; List price; Reference prices
