Journalartikel

Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?


AutorenlisteAidt, Toke; Asatryan, Zareh; Badalyan, Lusine; Heinemann, Friedrich

Jahr der Veröffentlichung2020

Seiten409-425

ZeitschriftThe Review of Economics and Statistics

Bandnummer102

Heftnummer3

ISSN0034-6535

eISSN1530-9142

Open Access StatusGreen

DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00820

VerlagMassachusetts Institute of Technology Press


Abstract
We report robust evidence of a new short-run monetary election cycle: the monthly growth rate of the money supply (M1) around elections is higher than in other months in a sample of low- and middle-income countries. We hypothesize this is related to systemic vote buying. Consistent with this, we find no cycle in authoritarian countries and countries with strong political institutions and a pronounced cycle in elections where international election monitors reported vote buying or in close elections. Using survey data on daily consumer expenditures, we show that within-household consumption of food increases in the days before elections.



Zitierstile

Harvard-ZitierstilAidt, T., Asatryan, Z., Badalyan, L. and Heinemann, F. (2020) Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(3), pp. 409-425. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00820

APA-ZitierstilAidt, T., Asatryan, Z., Badalyan, L., & Heinemann, F. (2020). Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 102(3), 409-425. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00820



Schlagwörter


BUDGET CYCLESCENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCECONSUMPTION RESPONSECORRUPTIONCREDIBILITYDEBT


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