Journalartikel
Autorenliste: de Haas, Samuel; Paha, Johannes
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2021
Seiten: 431-454
Zeitschrift: Review of Industrial Organization
Bandnummer: 58
Heftnummer: 3
ISSN: 0889-938X
eISSN: 1573-7160
Open Access Status: Hybrid
DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y
Verlag: Springer
Abstract:
This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.
Zitierstile
Harvard-Zitierstil: de Haas, S. and Paha, J. (2021) Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion, Review of Industrial Organization, 58(3), pp. 431-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y
APA-Zitierstil: de Haas, S., & Paha, J. (2021). Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion. Review of Industrial Organization. 58(3), 431-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y
Schlagwörter
Collusion; Common ownership; Cross ownership; FIRMS; Minority shareholdings; PARTIAL OWNERSHIP; STAKE
