Journal article

Publication year: 2021

Pages: 431-454

Journal: Review of Industrial Organization

Volume number: 58

Issue number: 3

ISSN: 0889-938X

eISSN: 1573-7160

Open access status: Hybrid

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y

Publisher: Springer

Abstract: 
This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.

Harvard Citation style: de Haas, S. and Paha, J. (2021) Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion, Review of Industrial Organization, 58(3), pp. 431-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y

APA Citation style: de Haas, S., & Paha, J. (2021). Non-Controlling Minority Shareholdings and Collusion. Review of Industrial Organization. 58(3), 431-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y