Journalartikel

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2018

Seiten: 577-590

Zeitschrift: Managerial and Decision Economics

Bandnummer: 39

Heftnummer: 5

ISSN: 0143-6570

eISSN: 1099-1468

Open Access Status: Green

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928

Verlag: Wiley

Abstract: 
We analyze exclusionary conduct of platforms in 2-sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard 2-sided market model, we show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for the incumbent and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the 2 shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.

Harvard-Zitierstil: Bruehn, T. and Goetz, G. (2018) Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers, Managerial and Decision Economics, 39(5), pp. 577-590. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928

APA-Zitierstil: Bruehn, T., & Goetz, G. (2018). Exclusionary practices in two-sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers. Managerial and Decision Economics. 39(5), 577-590. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2928