Journal article

Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations - an experimental study


Authors listGreiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian

Publication year2016

Pages32-43

JournalGames and Economic Behavior

Volume number97

ISSN0899-8256

eISSN1090-2473

DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009

PublisherElsevier


Abstract
We investigate a repeated public good game with group size two and stranger matching. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period, participants receive information regarding the evaluation of the previous period. Evaluations are subjective judgments, hence our reputation system allows for some degree of noise. There are two information treatments: Each participant receives information either about her partner's evaluation, or about her own and her partner's evaluation. The results show that although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluations, we find an increase in contributions. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.



Citation Styles

Harvard Citation styleGreiff, M. and Paetzel, F. (2016) Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations - an experimental study, Games and Economic Behavior, 97, pp. 32-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009

APA Citation styleGreiff, M., & Paetzel, F. (2016). Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations - an experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior. 97, 32-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009



Keywords


CONDITIONAL COOPERATIONEndogenous evaluationsGAMEIndirect reciprocityINDIRECT RECIPROCITYMonetaryNoisy reputationSecond-order beliefsVOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

Last updated on 2025-02-04 at 01:47