Journalartikel
Autorenliste: Hanf, Jon H.; Iselborn, Maximilian
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2015
Seiten: 193-203
Zeitschrift: Mitteilungen Klosterneuburg
Bandnummer: 65
Heftnummer: 3
ISSN: 0007-5922
Verlag: Höhere Bundeslehranst. und Bundesamt für Wein- und Obstbau Klosterneuburg
Abstract:
Regardless of their particular corporate structure and resulting challenges, German wine cooperatives have to face the international quality competition in the wine markets. This requires a homogeneous orientation of the cooperatives members to achieve the overall enterprise objectives. According to EILERS and HANF (1999), the present application of the principal-agent theory to German winegrowers' cooperatives could identify weaknesses and present solutions. It could be made clear that the conventional design of cooperative agreements, based on the calculation of the grape price with respect to sugar content, is not enough to implement a competitive strategy. Rather, incentives have to be set, inducing a demand and competition-oriented production of grapes among the members, creating a competitive positioning by a quality-oriented assortment.
Zitierstile
Harvard-Zitierstil: Hanf, J. and Iselborn, M. (2015) Analysis of quality interdependencies in winegrowers cooperatives, Mitteilungen Klosterneuburg, 65(3), pp. 193-203
APA-Zitierstil: Hanf, J., & Iselborn, M. (2015). Analysis of quality interdependencies in winegrowers cooperatives. Mitteilungen Klosterneuburg. 65(3), 193-203.
Schlagwörter
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES; CHAIN; double principal-agent problem; OWNERSHIP; RIGHTS; wine cooperatives