Journalartikel

Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2015

Seiten: 557-573

Zeitschrift: Economic Inquiry

Bandnummer: 53

Heftnummer: 1

ISSN: 0095-2583

eISSN: 1465-7295

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12134

Verlag: Wiley

Abstract: 
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. (JEL C72, C91, D71, D83)

Harvard-Zitierstil: Greiff, M. and Paetzel, F. (2015) INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL, Economic Inquiry, 53(1), pp. 557-573. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12134

APA-Zitierstil: Greiff, M., & Paetzel, F. (2015). INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL. Economic Inquiry. 53(1), 557-573. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12134