Journal article

Publication year: 2015

Pages: 557-573

Journal: Economic Inquiry

Volume number: 53

Issue number: 1

ISSN: 0095-2583

eISSN: 1465-7295

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12134

Publisher: Wiley

Abstract: 
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. (JEL C72, C91, D71, D83)

Harvard Citation style: Greiff, M. and Paetzel, F. (2015) INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL, Economic Inquiry, 53(1), pp. 557-573. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12134

APA Citation style: Greiff, M., & Paetzel, F. (2015). INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL. Economic Inquiry. 53(1), 557-573. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12134