Journalartikel

Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output


AutorenlisteTillmann, P

Jahr der Veröffentlichung2014

Seiten244-247

ZeitschriftEconomics Letters

Bandnummer123

Heftnummer2

DOI Linkhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

VerlagElsevier


Abstract

Central banks face uncertainty about potential output. We model optimal monetary policy under discretion in a situation in which the central bank adopts a min–max approach to policy. The case for appointing a conservative central banker who puts a larger weight on inflation stabilization becomes stronger as the central bank’s concern about misspecifications increases.




Zitierstile

Harvard-ZitierstilTillmann, P. (2014) Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output, Economics Letters, 123(2), pp. 244-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

APA-ZitierstilTillmann, P. (2014). Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output. Economics Letters. 123(2), 244-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021


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