Journalartikel
Autorenliste: Tillmann, P
Jahr der Veröffentlichung: 2014
Seiten: 244-247
Zeitschrift: Economics Letters
Bandnummer: 123
Heftnummer: 2
DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021
Verlag: Elsevier
Central banks face uncertainty about potential output. We model optimal monetary policy under discretion in a situation in which the central bank adopts a min–max approach to policy. The case for appointing a conservative central banker who puts a larger weight on inflation stabilization becomes stronger as the central bank’s concern about misspecifications increases.
Abstract:
Zitierstile
Harvard-Zitierstil: Tillmann, P. (2014) Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output, Economics Letters, 123(2), pp. 244-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021
APA-Zitierstil: Tillmann, P. (2014). Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output. Economics Letters. 123(2), 244-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021