Journal article

Publication year: 2014

Pages: 244-247

Journal: Economics Letters

Volume number: 123

Issue number: 2

DOI Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

Publisher: Elsevier

Abstract: 

Central banks face uncertainty about potential output. We model optimal monetary policy under discretion in a situation in which the central bank adopts a min–max approach to policy. The case for appointing a conservative central banker who puts a larger weight on inflation stabilization becomes stronger as the central bank’s concern about misspecifications increases.

Harvard Citation style: Tillmann, P. (2014) Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output, Economics Letters, 123(2), pp. 244-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

APA Citation style: Tillmann, P. (2014). Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output. Economics Letters. 123(2), 244-247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021